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Judicial Administration in a System of 
Independents: A Tribe with Only Chiefs 
The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace* 
A judge may select one of two themes for public discussion 
and ordinarily expect to receive a positive, perhaps even an en- 
thusiastic, response. One: The independence of the federal judi- 
cial branch, and of each individual judge within it, must be pre- 
served. The other: The work of the federal courts must be more 
effectively and efficiently administered. Judicial independence 
and effective judicial administration are both ideals with wide 
support. But, as not infrequently happens in our diverse system 
of free government, ideals collide. So it is with judicial independ- 
ence and judicial administration-in important areas, the rigor- 
ous pursuit of these two ideals leads to conflict. 
But-and this is one of the primary theses of this Arti- 
cle-out of the conflict may come acceptable and even beneficial 
compromise. The inevitable conflict, the inherent tension, need 
not be disruptive of the work of doing justice. 
In an attempt to illuminate the problems posed by the colli- 
sion of the polar ideals of judicial independence and effective 
judicial administration, this Article takes the following course: 
Section I contains a brief summary of the historical development 
and purposes of the doctrine of separation of powers and the 
corollary notion of an independent judiciary. Section I1 sets forth 
a review of the history of the judicial administration reform move- 
ment. This review encompasses already implemented as well as 
proposed systems for controlling the work of the judiciary. It will 
be proposed that the need for effective judicial administration is 
more acute today than ever in our history. Section 111 identifies 
several specific areas of the judicial independence-judicial ad- 
ministration conflict. In Section IV an attempt is made to formu- 
late a theoretical framework for compromise. Section V examines 
ways in which compromises-although not always consciously 
recognized as such-have been effected and criticizes the wisdom 
of those means. The judicial conference of the circuit will be 
* B.A., 1952, San Diego State University; LL.B., 1955, University of California, 
Berkeley (Boalt Hall); Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. This 
Article is a product of Judge Wallace's tenure as a Guest Scholar, Woodrow Wilson 
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identified as a potentially valuable engine for achieving intelli- 
gent compromise. 
In our country, the belief in the value of an independent 
federal judiciary is pervasive, even sacrosanct. This belief, so 
ingrained in our present thinking, did not emerge from any single 
event but rather developed in an evolutionary process that had 
its genesis long prior to the drafting of the Constitution. The 
taproot of the idea extends to the basic doctrine of separation of 
powers. This too had its evolutionary formation. Abstract think- 
ers in the days of Aristotle identified and analyzed many of the 
functions of the state,' but the concept that the powers of state 
should be separate and distinct, thus giving rise to an independ- 
ence between those powers, had a much later beginning.2 In the 
eighteenth century, Montesquieu observed: 
In every government there are three sorts of power: the 
legislative; the executive in things dependent on the law of na- 
tions; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the 
civil law. 
By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts tem- 
porary or perpetual laws, and amends or advocates those that 
have already been enacted. By the second, he makes peace or 
war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, 
and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes crimi- 
nals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. 
The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the others 
simply the executive powers of the state." 
Significantly, Montesquieu envisaged only two manifesta- 
tions of governmental power: legislative and executive. The exer- 
cise of judicial power was viewed as an executive function, and 
even in that setting the power was considered unimportant. Mon- 
tesquieu stated: "Of the three powers above mentioned, the judi- 
ciary is in some measure next to n~th ing ."~  
The revolution in England against the Stuart kings in 1688 
provided a new basis for the separation of powers and an inde- 
pendent judiciary. The Magna Carta had provided that "we will 
appoint justices . . . only such as know the law and mean duly 
1. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. IV, ch. 14; see also Ervin, Separation of Powers: 
Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. ROB. 108 (1970). 
2 .  See generally A.UHLER, REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS 3-4 (1942). 
3. B. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 162-63 (T. Nugent trans. 1902). 
4. Id. at 167. 
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to observe it well."5 The Great Charter, however, failed to restrict 
the power retained by the King to remove from office judges with 
whom he did not agree. It was the Stuarts' abuse of this removal 
power that led to the provision in the 1701 Act of Settlement that 
"judges commissions [shall] be made [during good behavior] 
. . .; but upon the address of both houses of parliament it may 
be lawful to remove. them."l This, together with the provision 
that judges' compensation could not be diminished, firmly estab- 
lished the independence of the judiciary in England.' 
The benefits of judicial independence enjoyed by English- 
men, however, were not shared by their cousins in the American 
Colonies. Here the judiciary served at the pleasure of the King.8 
Not surprisingly, when revolution came, the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence charged that King George 111 had "made judges de- 
pendent on his will alone for the tenure of their offices and the 
amount and payment of their salaries." Equally understandable 
was the interest of the Framers of the Constitution in establishing 
a judiciary with the independence earlier achieved in England. 
By following the lead of their English ancestors in granting judges 
both tenure "during good behavior" and an undiminishable sal- 
ary, the Framers were the first to provide guarantees for the inde- 
pendence of the judiciary in a written constitution. 
The concept of an independent federal judiciary was not 
immediately popular, however. Article 111 drew an inordinate 
share of attention in the ratification  debate^.^ The lack of imme- 
diate acceptance is perhaps understandable because the Colonies 
had already developed individual constitutions wherein they took 
differing approaches to the judicial branch. Some state legisla- 
tures had almost unlimited powers to select and remove judges. 
A number of legislatures were required to impeach judges for 
misconduct. Other colonies operated with variations on the same 
or different themes. lo 
5. MAGNA CARTA c1. 45. 
6 .  The Act of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3; see Ervin, supra note 1, at 
110-11. 
7. See Nelson, Variations on a Theme-Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S .  CAL. 
L. REV. 4, 13-14 (1962); Pittman, The Emancipated Judiciary in America: Its Colonial and 
Constitutional History, 37 A.B.A.J. 485 (1951); cf. Shapiro, Judicial Independence: The 
English Experience, 55 N.C.L. REV. 577 (1977) (explaining the evolution of the notion of 
judicial independence within the context of English history). 
8. Pittman, supra note 7, at 488. 
9. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 21-32 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as P. BATOR]. 
10. See Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and Ameri- 
can Precedents, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 138-47. 
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Madison, Hamilton, and Jay responded to the opponents of 
ratification in The Federalist. Madison's writings stressed the 
need for the separation of powers and for effective checks on 
power.ll In No. 38 he referred to the impeachment power of the 
Senate, and in No. 39 he argued for judicial tenure during good 
behavior. Hamilton also wrote in favor of tenure during good 
behavior,12 and in No. 79 he contended that the independence of 
the judges required that removal occur only by the process of 
impeachment: 
They are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House 
of Representatives and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, 
may be dismissed from office and disqualified for holding any 
other. This is the only provision on the point, which is consistent 
with the necessary independence of the judicial character 
. . . .  
"13 
Hamilton saw no other excuse for the removal of judges except 
insanity.14 
It has accurately been said that the Framers "hoped to make 
the judges free from popular pressure and from legislative control. 
Their purpose was to create a truly independent judiciary limited 
only by the cumbersome process of impeachment."15 Their ulti- 
mate goal was to create a judiciary sufficiently independent to 
resist the natural tendencies of individuals and groups in govern- 
ment to seek dominion once given an original grant of power. 
The evolutionary process leading to judicial independence 
did not end with the ratification of the Constitution, however. 
The era of Chief Justice John Marshall was particularly impor- 
tant in the futher definition of an independent judiciary. For 
example, the power of judicial review exercised in Marbury v. 
Madison16 was of inestimable value in this developmental pro- 
cess. Likewise important was the acquittal of Justice Samuel 
Chase in 1805 in impeachment proceedings before the Senate. 
Although the margin was narrow, the acquittal constituted a sig- 
nal precedent that impeachment and removal were to be reserved 
for "serious" offenses of misbehavior, not mere disagreement with 
a judge's opinions.17 And certainly the concept of judicial inde- 
11.  See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 46, 48 (J. Madison). 
12. See id. No. 78 (A. Hamilton). 
13. Id. No. 79, at 514 (Bicentennial ed. 1976). 
14. Id. 
15. Ziskind, supra note 10, at 153. 
16. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
17. See Rehnquist, Political Battles for Judicial Independence, 50 WASH. L REV. 835, 
836-42 (1975). The trial and acquittal of Justice Chase established that, in Justice 
391 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 43 
pendence continues to receive form and meaning today. Indeed, 
the fact that judicial independence is not a static doctrine gives 
rise to the basic problem examined in this Article. 
It is important to note a t  this point that much of what has 
been reviewed above supports only the independence of the judi- 
cial branch and not necessarily the independence of an individual 
judge within that branch. The independence necessary to check 
and balance legislative and executive power may be sufficiently 
provided without shielding the individual judge from intrabranch 
controls. In other words, establishing the major premise that the 
judicial branch must be independent does not necessarily require 
the conclusion that the individual judge must be free from coer- 
cion or control by his peers. 
Nevertheless, our firmly established tradition is one of inde- 
pendent judges within an independent judicial branch. Justice 
Douglas expressed the tradition in these words: 
An independent judiciary is one of this Nation's outstanding 
characteristics. Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate 
and takes his oath, he is independent of every other judge. He 
commonly works with other federal judges who are likewise sov- 
ereign. But neither one alone nor any number banded together 
can act as censor and place sanctions on him.18 
Senator Ervin articulated a similar judgment when he noted that 
"[tlhe separation of powers concept as understood by the found- 
ing fathers assumed the existence of a judicial system free from 
outside influence of whatever kind and from whatever source, and 
further assumed that each individual judge would be free from 
coercion even from his own brethren. "I9 
Perhaps this tradition of independent judges is most graphi- 
cally-if not extravagantly-portrayed by two stories, the first 
told by Judge Edward Lumbard, former chief and now senior 
judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Two district judges 
met after they had not seen each other for many months. The 
junior of the two summoned a smile and said, "How are you 
today, Judge?" After a long pause, the more senior replied, "It's 
none of your damn business, and I wouldn't tell you that  much if 
Rehnquist's words, "the constitutional language conferring tenure on Article 111 judges 
'during good behavior' was to be read with a view to the protection of judicial independ- 
ence even a t  the cost of enduring partisan judges." Id. at 842. 
18. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 136 (1970) (Doug- 
las, J., dissenting). 
19. Ervin, supra note 1, a t  121 (emphasis added). 
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I hadn't known you for thirty years."20 The second story involves 
two members of the Supreme Court. Once Justice James C. 
McReynolds was late to conference. Chief Justice Hughes said, 
"Go tell him we're waiting." The testy McReynolds sent word 
back: "Go tell the CJ I don't work for him."21 
The question, of course, is whether such autonomy and fierce 
independence can or ought to be invariably maintained in an 
ever-larger judiciary required to serve an increasingly complex 
society. 
When the provisions of the Constitution's article I11 were 
implemented by the Judiciary Act of 1789,22 the six Supreme 
Court justices and the widely scattered federal trial court judges 
hardly needed any kind of formal administrative structure to 
facilitate their work. In the early decades of the Republic, the 
federal trial court judges were administratively autonomous in a 
nearly absolute sense. Almost like feudal lords, they oversaw, and 
had direct control of, all aspects of their court's work. 
As the nation developed and society became more complex, 
however, the ability of the court system (state and federal) to 
serve that  society failed to keep pace. Then in 1906, Roscoe 
Pound, a Nebraska lawyer and later dean of Harvard Law School, 
stimulated a movement for judicial reform and administrative 
control with an address before the American Bar Ass~cia t ion.~~ 
He charged that our court system was archaic and inefficient and 
urged the adoption of organizational reforms that would reduce 
the "causes of popular dissatisfaction with the administration of 
justice." 
Significant reforms in the administration of the federal 
courts began soon thereafter. In 1913, former President William 
Howard Taft, a man possessed of strong feelings about the im- 
portance of administrative machinery to improve the work of the 
courts, was appointed Chief Justice of the United States. As Pres- 
ident, he had established a commission which studied methods 
of improving government. Immediately following his appoint- 
20. Lumbard, The Place of the Federal Judicial Councils in the Administration of 
the Courts, 47 A.B.A.J. 169, 170 (1961). 
21. SMITHSONIAN, Feb. 1977, at 85. 
22. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 
(1789). 
23. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964). 
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ment to the bench he launched a crusade to do the same in the 
judiciary. Fortunately, Taft was in a unique position: he not only 
held the highest judicial office in the nation, he also wore the 
mantle of an ex-President. Because of his experience in the politi- 
cal arena, he knew full well the practical political implications of 
judicial reform. Although some of his ideas met with defeat, he 
was able to pave the way for creation of the Judicial Conference 
of Senior Circuit Judges (now known as the Judicial Conference 
of the United  state^).^^ The Judicial Conference of the United 
States was created as an informal body to provide a means of 
improving communication within the judiciary and facilitating 
the assignment of judges to areas with particularly heavy case- 
loads .25 
No additional judicial machinery was engineered for seven- 
teen years. Then, in the Administrative Office Act of 1939,26 Con- 
gress created two new institutions to assist in judicial administra- 
tion-the Administrative Office and the judicial councils of the 
circuits-and formalized a third-the judicial conferences of the 
 circuit^.^' Additionally, Congress increased the power of the Judi- 
cial Conference of the United States by granting it certain super- 
visory responsibilities over the newly created Administrative Of- 
fice. The Administrative Office was directed by the Act to assume 
from the Justice Department the ministerial functions of admin- 
istration within the courts, including the payment of salaries and 
the allocation of 
The judicial council of the circuit (sometimes referred to as 
the circuit council) is composed of the active circuit judges of 
each circuit. It is presided over by the chief judge of the circuit 
and is required to meet a t  least twice annually. Its duties are to 
consider the quarterly reports of the Administrative Office and to 
"make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious ad- 
ministration of the business of the courts within its circuit."29 The 
district judges of the circuit are directed to "promptly carry into 
24. For a review and analysis of Taft's role in judicial administration, see P.  FISH, 
THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 24-32 (1973) ; Fish, William Howard 
Taft and Charles Evans Hughes: Conservative Politicians as Chief Judicial Reformers, 
1975 SUP. CT. REV. 123. 
25. Wallace, Must We Have the Nunn Bill?: The Alternative of Judicial Councils of 
the Circuits, 51 IND. L.J. 297, 311 (1976). 
26. Ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 4 8  332-333, 456, 601-610 (1970)). 
27. Following the lead of Chief Justice Parker of the Fourth Circuit, other circuits 
established informal conferences to improve judicial administration. The 1939 Act man- 
dated the convening of these conferences. See notes 96-100 and accompanying text infra. 
28. See Wallace, supra note 25, at 312. 
29. 28 U.S.C. 4 332(d) (1970); see Wallace, supra note 25, at 312. 
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effect all orders" of the circuit council.30 Except for a few specific 
provisions appearing elsewhere in the United States Code,31 the 
grant of power and responsibility in the Administrative Office Act 
provides the basis for all the council's formal actions.32 
As has been noted, the Administrative Office Act also for- 
malized the judicial conference of the circuit (sometimes referred 
to as the circuit conference). The circuit conference, composed of 
all district and circuit judges of the circuit plus designated law- 
yers, is convened "for the purpose of considering the business of 
the courts and advising means of improving the administration 
of justice within [the] ~ i r cu i t . "~Thus  the conference has a sta- 
tutory responsibility to give advice. The recipient of such advice 
should be the judicial council of the circuit, which possesses the 
power to act in response to it. If the particular advice also involves 
other circuits and is otherwise appropriate, the circuit council 
should forward the information to the Judicial Conference of the 
United States. 
Following the reforms legislated in the 1939 Act, the next 
major change in judicial administration occurred in 1967 with the 
establishment of the Federal Judicial Center.34 The statutory pur- 
pose of the center is "to further the development and adoption of 
improved judicial administration in the courts of the United 
 state^."^^ The Center is directed to conduct research, make rec- 
ommendations to the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
provide continuing education programs, and assist the Judicial 
Conference of the United States and its  committee^.^^ The Center 
is governed by a Board of Directors made up of two active appel- 
late judges and three active district court judges, together with 
30. 28 U.S.C. 8 332(d) (1970). 
31. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. $ 4  134(c), 137, 140(a), 142, 295, 372(b), 457, 1863(a) (1970). 
32. I t  should be observed that there has been disagreement concerning the nature of 
the circuit councils' powers. Some view the councils as purely administrative bodies 
without any judicial powers whose role is to deal with the problems of administering the 
courts. Others see the councils as bodies with certain judicial prerogatives, including the 
power to determine the fitness of a judge to hear cases. The legislative history is subject 
to both interpretations, but it should be noted that the councils were created by an act 
designed to speed up the administration of justice. While the possibility of disciplining 
problem judges through the councils' tools was considered, discipline was certainly not 
the Administrative Office Act's primary purpose. Indeed, two bills aimed specifically a t  
. the makeup of the judiciary had been expressly rejected by Congress within the three years 
prior to  its passage. This fact adds credence to the less expansive view of the scope of the 
circuit councils' power, and it is a view that has received some judicial approval. See 
Wallace, supra note 25, a t  313. 
33. 28 U.S.C. Q 333 (1970). 
34. See P. FISH, supra note 24, a t  369. 
35. 28 U.S.C. Q 620 (1970). 
36. Id. 
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the Director of the Administrative Office. This Board of Directors 
is chaired by the Chief Justice of the United States." 
Reforms in federal judicial administration have thus culmi- 
nated in a basic administrative machinery with five component 
parts. At the top is the Judicial Conference of the United 
States-an organization which may be loosely analogized to a 
board of directors without the authority to enter orders.38 Its 
power as such comes from its membership (the Chief Justice of 
the United States together with the chief judge of each circuit and 
others) and its position at the apex of the judicial administration 
structure. 
Next in line is the judicial council of the circuit. Made up of 
the active circuit judges of the circuit, it too possesses a certain 
amount of persuasive power because of its membership. But each 
council, as distinguished from the other components in the fed- 
eral judicial administration system, may "make all necessary 
orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the 
business of the courts within its circuit."" Although it is not clear 
as to how and under what circumstances such orders may be 
issued,40 strong and articulate voices have called for more action 
on the part of the circuit councils.41 
The third tier of the judicial administration structure is the 
judicial conference of the circuit. Its power is advisory only. The 
fourth and fifth components of the administrative structure, the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the Fed- 
eral Judicial Center, provide staff assistance for the other three 
tiers. 
Close analysis of this administrative structure reveals an in- 
tent to decentralize. The power to order has been given solely to 
the circuit councils, and the focal point of action should be those 
councils. The total machinery provides correlation and, in some 
instances, establishes policy. However, any effort to nationalize 
and centralize judicial administration at  the highest level would 
be a t  odds with the present statutory structure.42 
37. Id. § 621. 
38. See Burger, The Courts on Trial: A Call for Action Against Delay, 44 A.B.A.J. 
738, 798 (1958). 
39. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970). 
40. See Wallace, supra note 25, at 313; see also Chandler v. Judicial Council of the 
Tenth Circuit, 398 US.  74 (1970). 
41. Burger, supra note 38, at 798; Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal 
Judicial Administration, 37 U .  CHI. L. REV. 203 (1970). 
42. Chief Justice Hughes was a strong advocate of decentralization. See Fish, supra 
note 24, at 140-44; Lumbard, supra note 20, at 169. When a proposed bill giving all 
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Significantly, the five-component administrative structure 
outlined above is essentially intrabranch. The Constitution it- 
self, of course, provides the one significant extrabranch control 
over the judiciary: impeachment and removal. Yet, despite the 
fact that any additional nonconstitutional extrabranch control 
raises serious questions involving the separation of powers doc- 
trine and the independence of the judiciary, efforts have been 
made repeatedly to create such extrabranch controls. 
A recent example involved the congressional formulation of 
the code of judicial ethics. In 1924 the American Bar Association, 
in cooperation with the judiciary, approved the Canons of Judi- 
cial Ethimd3 Subsequently, there was additional pressure to 
renew or revise the canons to control more directly the activities 
of the judges.44 As a result, the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, on June 10, 1969, adopted regulations forbidding the ac- 
ceptance of income from nonjudicial sources without prior ap- 
proval of the judicial council of the circuit.45 This action was 
subsequently suspended to await the formulation by the Ameri- 
can Bar Association of a new Code of Judicial C o n d u ~ t . ~ ~  When 
the Code appeared, it was adopted by the Judicial Conference of 
the United States." Congress, however, was not satisfied with the 
judiciary's efforts to establish its own rules and therefore passed 
a statute, which in some ways conflicted with the standards 
adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States.48 
-- - - 
administrative authority to one national administrative office came to his attention, he 
responded in these terms: 
I think the difficulty in this present bill lies in an undue centralization . . . My 
thought is that there should be a greater attention to local authority and local 
responsibility . . . My thought is that in each circuit there should be an organi- 
zation which will have direct and immediate responsibility with regard to the 
judicial work in that circuit. My suggestion for your consideration is that there 
should be in each circuit a judicial council . . . . 
J .  Covington, Autonomy v. Efficiency-The Continuing Debate on Judicial Supervision 
of Federal Trial Judges 56 n.111 (July 23,1973) (unpublished paper presented to executive 
session of judges of United States District Courts and United States Court of Appeals of 
the Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco) (quoting Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States 12 (1938)). 
43. McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. ROB. 9, 
15 (1970). 
44. Id. 
45. Clark, Judicial Self-Regulation-Its Potential, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. ROB. 37, 40 
(1970); see Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 138 (1970) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
46. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 9
(1970). 
47. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 9- 
11 (1973). 
48. Compare AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, canon 3C (1972) 
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A more significant and threatening example of nonjudicial 
efforts to control the judiciary has been the rather constant agita- 
tion for some type of machinery which could remove federal 
judges without the lengthy process of impeachment. Such a legis- 
lative effort was initiated in the late l930's, primarily due to the 
efforts of Congressman Hatton S u m n e r ~ . ~ ~  A more recent attempt 
was made in 1966 by Senator Joseph Tydings, then chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Improvements of Judicial M a ~ h i n e r y . ~ ~  The 
most recent effort to provide a means for circumventing the im- 
peachment process was made by Senator Nunn in 1975.51 I have 
discussed the Nunn bill elsewhere, arguing that it is unwise and 
Each year new legislation aimed at controlling the function- 
ing of the judiciary in one fashion or another is presented to 
Congress. Pending before the federal legislature are two bills that 
would require full financial disclosure annually by each federal 
and a bill to establish a judicial tenure council to deal 
with, among other things, removal of federal judges for improper 
In recent years, bills have been introduced that would 
strike the grandfather clause from the statute that forbids a chief 
judge from serving past the age of 70,55 and that would provide 
for the review of the behavior of individual justices and judges by 
a three-judge panel? In addition, Congress had before it both a 
proposed constitutional amendment requiring reconfirmation of 
Supreme Court Justices every eight years and lower court judges 
every six years,57 and proposed articles of impeachment aimed at  
the forty-four federal judges who brought a lawsuit against the 
United States contending that their compensation had been un- 
constitutionally d imin i~hed .~~ 
with Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (amending 28 U.S.C. $ 455 
(1970)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1974). 
49. See Wallace, supra note 25, at 303. 
50. See id. at 303-04. 
51. See id. a t  297, 302-11. 
52. Id. at 297. 
53. H.R. 4453, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 3828, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
No action has yet been taken on these bills. 
54. S. 1423, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
55. S. 1130, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The grandfather clause provides that the 
retirement provision is inapplicable to any district with two judges where the chief judge 
continues to act in his capacity as chief judge. Id. 4 3. 
56. H.R. 10439, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
57. S.J. Res. 175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
58. H.R. Res. 1066,94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); see Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 
1028 (Ct. C1. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 718 (1978) (Congress' nondiscriminatory failure 
to raise judicial salaries not violative of compensation clause). 
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This Article later argues that the need for controls to facili- 
tate effective judicial administration has never been greater.5g At 
this point, however, it is necessary to state emphatically that the 
extrabranch controls of the sort just reviewed are not what the 
nation, or the judiciary, needs. In the first place, extrabranch 
controls by their very nature create a serious risk of violating the 
fundamental doctrine of separation of powers. As Justice Suther- 
land stated: "The sound application of [that doctrine] that 
makes one master in his own house precludes him from imposing 
his control in the house of another who is master there?O Also, 
the purpose of many of the proposed extrabranch controls is to 
regulate judges whose personal conduct is deemed aberrational. 
Yet even the most ardent advocates of extrabranch controls 
admit that it is only the personal conduct of a very few that is 
open to question. Senator Tydings referred to the "tiny handful" 
of judges who harm the efficient administration of justice and 
then stated that "it is not our intention to conduct an expos6 on 
the federal judiciary. Such an expose would, indeed, find little to 
expo~e."~' The independence of the judiciary should not be com- 
promised by a system of controls prompted by the improprieties 
of a very few. Finally, the judiciary itself has both the administra- 
tive structure, if properly used, and the ability necessary to im- 
plement reforms that will successfully meet many of the chal- 
lenges that make effective judicial administration imperative. 
While the quality of the federal judiciary is high, the need 
for effective administration in the federal courts is not seriously 
contested. The root cause of that need is, of course, the massive 
increase in the workload of the federal courts a t  all levels. At the 
district court level, the number of new cases filed each year since 
1970 has increased 42%, to an average of about 450 cases per 
judge~hip . '~  Particular types of cases have increased dramati- 
cally. In 1976, for example, 85% more environmental cases were 
filed than in 1973." In 1970 there was a disconcerting backlog of 
114,000 cases awaiting disposal. By 1975 that number had risen 
to 142,000,64 despite the fact that in the five years from 1970 to 
59. See notes 62-69 and accompanying text infra. 
60. Humphrey's Ex'r. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935). 
61. Procedures for the Removal, Retirement, and Disciplining of Unfit Federal 
Judges: Hearings on Judicial Fitness Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1966). 
62. Burger, Year End Report, 62 A.B.A.J. 189 (1976). 
63. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
197 (1976). 
64. See Burger, supra note 62, at 189. 
391 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 51 
1975 district court judges improved their productivity-measured 
in terms of cases disposed of-by 27%.65 The growth in the work- 
load of federal appellate courts has been even more dramatic. 
Appellate filings increased a t  the rate of 113% between 1968 and 
1976; during this same period, the backlog of undecided cases 
grew by 83%.66 
It is not just the sheer number of cases, however, but also the 
types of cases which are being handled by the federal courts that 
intensify the problem. Environmental and consumer litigation, 
for example, tend to "require judicial energy output far beyond 
the average case?' A related problem is exemplified by the re- 
cently enacted Speedy Trial Act? That legislation, while not 
directly increasing the judiciary's workload per se, will cause 
immense problems of caseload management because it severely 
compresses the disposition time permitted in criminal cases? 
The result of this ever-mounting number of increasingly 
complex cases is delay and congestion in the federal courts. That 
delay has now reached such proportions that society is no longer 
being properly served by its judicial system. In response to the 
problem, a wide variety of solutions have been proposed. Despite 
their diversity of source and content, all these proposals have one 
common characteristic: they will necessarily entail, either di- 
rectly or indirectly, some incremental increase in control over 
federal judges and their work.70 Indeed, any solution that entirely 
avoids increased control seems incapable of formulation. Accord- 
ingly, if the problem is to be solved to any measurable degree, the 
solution will to some extent reduce the independence of individ- 
ual judges and the independence of the judicial branch. 
Conflict between the ideals of judicial independence and 
effective judicial administration is pervasive on a theoretical 
level. This is due primarily to the difficulty of defining the ideals 
65. Id. 
66. See id. 
67. Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate 
System, 59 CORNELL . REV. 576, 582 (1974). 
68. 18 U.S.C. $ 0  3161-3174 (Supp. V 1975). 
69. Division of Information Systems, Statistical Analysis and Reports Branch & 
Office of the General Counsel, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Impact 
Study: The Effect of Major Statutes and Events on Criminal and Civil Caseload in the 
U.S. District Courts During Fiscal Years 1960-1975, at 28 (Apr. 19, 1976). 
70. One possible exception to this statement might be proposals that would simply 
increase the number of federal judges. See, e.g., H.R. 7843,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
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in any terms short of absolute. Judicial independence may most 
readily be defined as a freedom, possessed by the individual 
judge, to dispose of all business brought before him, to manage 
the personnel attached to his court and its physical aspects, and 
to conduct his personal affairs as he sees fit and without limita- 
tions in the form of externally imposed formal controls. In the 
same vein, judicial administration in its broadest sense may be 
defined as any formal system or structure that places coercive 
authority in any individual, group of individuals, or institution 
which is or can be exercised to determine how or when business 
before the individual judge will be handled, how court facilities 
and personnel will be managed, or w'hat course the judge's per- 
sonal conduct will or will not take." 
On a practical level, the scope of actual conflict is narrow-at 
least in comparison to the scope of conflict theoretically possible. 
This is due in part to tradition. For example, appellate review of 
a trial court's factual and legal conclusions in a particular case is 
not deemed an encroachment on judicial independence, although 
that  review certainly operates to control the work of the trial 
judge. In addition, congressionally designed limitations on the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts likewise constitute a significant 
external control, but because that control is generally considered 
to be constitutionally based72 it rarely is viewed as an assault on 
the citadel of judicial autonomy. Then too, uniform rules of pro- 
cedure present theoretical but generally no practical conflicts. All 
of these examples may be viewed as the products of old compro- 
mises, although perhaps not recognized as such at  the time of 
their making. 
The actual conflicts, that is, the conflicts which are presently 
perceived as such, arise out of the attempted use of new forms of 
control. Thus, the first order of a circuit council prohibiting the 
future assignment of cases to a district judge was litigated to the 
Supreme Court where it was expressly recognized that the ulti- 
mate issue was whether that action constituted "permissible in- 
tervention consistent with the constitutional requirement of judi- 
cial independence."'Wther relatively new forms of control al- 
ready discussed, such as limits on and reports concerning extraju- 
71. This definition of judicial administration is used only to show the theoretical 
extent of the judicial independence-judicial administration conflict. It is not the definition 
of judicial administration that I would adopt for all purposes. For a discussion of various 
definitions of judicial administration, see D. NELSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE XXV-xxvi (1974). 
72. See P. BATOR, supra note 9, at 309-438. 
73. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970). 
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dicial compensation, are also considered by some judges as incon- 
sistent with their independen~e.'~ 
A striking example of the perceived conflict which arises 
when new controls are introduced was revealed in comments 
made by members of the judiciary a t  the time of the establish- 
ment of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
For example, one judge stated: 
A word of warning is appropriate. It is inevitable that a director 
[of the Administrative Office] will come to feel that he has 
something to direct. As long as he confines his direction to the 
staff under him, he is performing his duty, but when he inter- 
feres with the work of the judges he should promptly and em- 
phatically be reb~ffed.'~ 
Another judge warned that  the "judicial reform movement is 
tending too far in the direction of subordinating the administra- 
tive authority of the trial judge."76 Now, however, the transfer of 
most of a judge's logistical and general housekeeping duties to the 
Administrative Office is, as to those chores, infrequently viewed 
as a check on judicial independence. Although a few judges view 
that office as a threatening bureaucratic giant, most are gladly 
relieved of minor ministerial tasks. They may well share the sen- 
timents of Judge Learned Hand: "I utterly loathe . . . and thor- 
oughly despise [administrative tasks], as 'work for the learned 
pig' as John Grey used to say of c~nveyancing."~~ However, if the 
Administrative Office begins to assert added control, above and 
beyond minor housekeeping responsibilities, the specter of con- 
flict would again arise. 
Another form of administrative control which has drawn 
some criticism as it has extended itself into new areas is the office 
of chief judge. Within each circuit court, and within each district 
court which has more than two district judges, the judge who is 
most senior in service and has not yet reached the age of 70 is 
designated the chief judge, unless he declines to act.78 The chief 
judge exercises supervisory powers in many areas. Although these 
responsibilities are administrative in nature, a strong chief 
74. See, e.g., id. at 138-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
75. J. Covington, supra note 42, at 5 (quoting comments of then Senior Circuit Judge 
Curtis D. Wilbur). 
76. Chandler, The Role of the Trial Judge in the Anglo-American Legal System, 50 
A.B.A.J. 125, 129 (1964). 
77. Letter from Learned Hand to D. Lawrence Groner (Apr. 5, 1944), reprinted in P. 
FISH, supra note 24, at 405. 
78. 28 U.S.C. §§  45, 136 (1970). 
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judge-because of his centralized administrative powers, the re- 
spect which is held for his office, and, in some cases, his personal- 
ity-exercises a significant degree of control over his brother and 
sister judges.7g As a result, the chief judge is often able to work 
informally to solve problems, and do so as effectively and some- 
times more effectively than administrators working through the 
formal administrative machinery established by C o n g r e ~ s . ~ ~  Nev-
ertheless, the role of the chief judge, when maintained within 
traditional boundaries, is probably universally accepted by 
judges. Criticism surfaces only when the chief judge assumes new 
functions. If one commentator is correct, a new area of conflict is 
on the horizon. He predicted that 
[Wlithin the judicial segment, the individual judges will prob- 
ably encounter a growing shift of power to the chief (or presid- 
ing) judge and to his court administrator, both of whom will 
increasingly employ technology to standardize the quantity and 
directions of case decisions. . . . [This] initial sharing of ad- 
ministrative power will lead, by accretion, to the dominance of 
court administrators (staff personnel) over the chief judges (the 
line superiors) because of the greater expertise possessed by the 
former 
In light of the above discussion, it appears that new forms of 
administrative control-whether designed from whole cloth or 
developed in evolutionary fashion from traditional forms-are 
almost inevitable. As the federal judiciary becomes larger, as its 
workload continues to burgeon, and as the type of work it does 
becomes more complex, the judiciary or some external institution 
like Congress will modify the judiciary's structure and methods 
of operation to accommodate these changes. If history is a sound 
guide, and it probably is in this area, these new controls will 
create conflict by pitting the ideal of judicial independence 
against the ideal of effective judicial administration. That con- 
flict need not be disruptive, however. Beneficial compromises are 
possible, although not assured. 
IV. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPROMISE 
Two insights into the fundamental nature of the judicial 
79. See Weinstein, The Role of a Chief Judge in a Modern System of Justice, 28 REC. 
A.B. CITY N.Y. 291 (1973); Prettyman, The Duties of a Circuit Chief Judge, 46 A.B.A.J. 
633 (1960). 
80. See Wallace, supra note 25, at 324-25. 
81. Gazell, Developmental Syndromes in Judicial Management, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 
587, 620 (1972). 
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independence-judicial administration conflict permit develop- 
ment of a conceptual framework for compromise. The first in- 
sight, developed by Professor Covington, is that judicial inde- 
pendence is divisible into separate, although related, compo- 
n e n t ~ . ~ ~  Covington identifies these as "logistical or housekeep- 
ing autonomy," "decision autonomy," and "trial practice and 
personal conduct autonomy."" The second insight is surpris- 
ingly simple although continually overlooked: Both ideals of 
judicial independence and effective judicial administration are 
not ends in themselves but merely means of achieving a more 
fundamental goal, which may be called, for want of a better term, 
the doing of justice. 
In Covington's analysis, logistical or housekeeping autonomy 
involves the judge's control over such activities as personnel 
selection, recordkeeping, reporting of data on the court's work, 
and operation of the court's budget. Decision autonomy is the 
power of the judge to make decisions in the cases before him. 
Trial practice autonomy consists of the judge's power to deter- 
mine what his conduct shall be on the bench and how the activi- 
ties in his courtroom shall be regulated. Personal conduct auton- 
omy is the power of the judge to determine the course of his off- 
the-bench conduct.84 
Administrative innovations that can fairly be said to impli- 
cate only logistical autonomy generally are not viewed as inimical 
to judicial independence. Housekeeping chores for the most part 
have been shifted already to the Administrative Office. This 
transfer of responsibilities was, in part, a response to the massive 
amount of detail work necessary for the functioning of a large and 
complex judicial system. As has been noted, the shift in responsi- 
bility for these chores has not been a major source of i r r i t a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
The difficulty, of course, is to identify innovations which 
implicate only logistical autonomy. This difficulty is illustrated 
by the Justice Department's 1932 attempt to eliminate the posi- 
tion of messenger of the federal judge. In response, the Judicial 
Conference of the Fourth Circuit passed a resolution stating that 
such action would decrease the performance of the district judges 
and would delay and interfere with prompt handling of judicial 
business.86 Is access to a messenger purely an incident of logistical 
82. J. Covington, supra note 42. 
83. Id. at 2-3. 
84. Id. at 3. 
85. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra. 
86. See P. FISH, supra note 24, at 150-51. 
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autonomy or does it involve decision autonomy? True the mes- 
senger would not make decisions, but if he would preserve valua- 
ble time and allow a judge to carry out his decisionmaking pro- 
cesses more adequately and promptly, it can reasonably be 
argued that elimination of the messenger would be an incursion 
into judicial independence. 
While logistical autonomy may be reduced without impair- 
ing judicial independence, complete preservation of decision au- 
tonomy is fundamental. Even the most ardent proponents of in- 
creased administrative control voice support for the sovereignty 
of the individual judge in this area. The following observation of 
Professor Covington conveys the view of most observers regarding 
decision autonomy, a view that is fully supported by the history 
of judicial independence outlined in Section I: 
[I]t is incumbent upon the judges themselves to fight back if 
efficiency programs become overzealous and interfere with 
"total and absolute independence of judges in deciding cases or 
in any phase of the decisional function." An independent judici- 
ary is not a luxury. The country can afford some inefficient 
judges if the price of efficiency is damage to decision auto- 
n o m ~ . ~ ~  
The tensions and conflicts between judicial administration 
and judicial independence most frequently manifest themselves 
in the area of trial practice and personal conduct autonomy. This 
conflict surfaced in Chandler v. Judicial Council of t h e  T e n t h  
CircuitRR when a circuit council prohibited the assignment of any 
new cases to a district judge. Writing for the majority, Chief 
Justice Burger intimated that in this area autonomy is a dimin- 
ishable commodity. 
There can, of course, be no disagreement among us as to the 
imperative need for total and absolute independence of judges 
in deciding cases or in any phase of the decisional function. But 
it is quite another matter to say that each judge in a complex 
system shall be the absolute ruler of his manner of conducting 
judicial business. The question is whether Congress can vest in 
the Judicial Council power to enforce reasonable standards as 
to when and where court shall be held, how long a case may be 
delayed in decision, whether a given case is to be tried, and 
many other routine matters. As to these things-and indeed an 
almost infinite variety of others of an administrative na- 
87. J. Covington, supra note 42, at 43. 
88. 398 U.S. 74 (1970). 
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ture-can each judge be an absolute monarch and yet have a 
complex judicial system function e f f i c i en t l~?~~  
In dissent, Justices Black and Douglas forcefully argued against 
any encroachment on trial practice and personal conduct auto- 
nomy by any means other than impeachment and removal.g0 This 
sharp conflict of opinions is representative of the tensions inher- 
ent in this area. 
That tension is aggravated because the opposing factions 
tend to view their respective causes-either judicial independ- 
ence or effective judicial administration-as a final goal, an ulti- 
mate and inviolable ideal. The historic evolution of the concept 
of judicial independence and the judicial administration reform 
movement outlined in the first two sections of this Article effec- 
tively refutes those extreme views. Both ideals have a purpose 
beyond their own self-perpetuation, namely the meaningful dis- 
pensation of justice. Neither judicial independence nor judicial 
efficiency is of value unless it contributes to that ultimate goal, 
and it is against that goal that proposed administrative reforms 
should be measured. Any innovation that furthers the ubiquitous 
trend toward standardization and uniformity merely for the sake 
of the appearance of efficiency should be rejected. By the same 
token, if an innovation realistically promises to make the dispen- 
sation of justice swifter and surer, and hence more meaningful, 
no judge could in good conscience oppose that reform unless it 
constituted an unwarranted infringement on judicial independ- 
ence and therefore a long term threat to the personal liberties of 
all citizens. What is required, in short, is an  evaluative and bal- 
ancing process. 
An important observation should be made about the evalua- 
tive aspect of that process. I t  would be a serious mistake to attack 
all present inefficiencies in the judicial system as inappropriate. 
Chief Judge David Bazelon has reminded us that 
the heart of the judicial process is by its very nature inefficient. 
The way towards "efficiency" in the courts is not to shortcut 
judicial procedures in order to dispose of more cases in less time. 
Such a solution is equivalent to a surgeon's omitting time- 
consuming diagnostic procedures and simply operating at  ran- 
d o m .  . . . 91 
89. Id. at 84-85. 
90. Id. at 129-43 (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting). 
91. Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a Democratic Society, 46 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 653, 660 (1971). 
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Joseph Ebersole of the Federal Judicial Center has reached a 
similar conclusion. In discussing the unique problems of formu- 
lating a design process for computer application in a court sys- 
tem, he observed that the judicial system is, to some extent, a 
nonsystem. 
Supposedly, people in an organization all work to further one 
general objective and although there are opposing forces in ex- 
istence, these are normally not intended to operate a t  cross pur- 
poses. Business organizations, for example, strive for efficiency 
and attempt to systematize as many activities as possible to 
further this goal. But the administration of justice is, in some 
respects, inherently inefficient. The due process model is a pur- 
posive obstacle course and its inefficiency and, what some might 
consider its irrationality, provide major protection to individu- 
als .92 
When judges, in the name of judicial autonomy, defend these 
necessary inefficiencies and demonstrate a reluctance to change, 
the reluctance should not be viewed as mere obstreperousness. 
The reluctance is motivated rather by the basic belief, held by 
most judges, that the system can work effectively to provide jus- 
tice only so long as judges are free and independent in their ulti- 
mate decisionmaking process. 
As new forms of administrative controls have created new 
judicial independence-judicial administration tensions, accom- 
modations and compromises have occurred. Unfortunately, these 
compromises have all too often been products of default and inac- 
tion rather than of an open process of evaluation and balancing. 
An example of this sort of compromise may be seen in the 
conduct of the circuit councils. The discussion in Section TI 
makes it clear that the circuit councils have authority to issue 
orders which could interfere with the trial practice autonomy of 
district judges as well as their personal conduct.93 Yet, in many 
instances, the circuit councils have been reluctant to enter into 
this arena.94 This reticence cannot be ascribed wholly to road- 
blocks which might be inferred from dicta in Chandler v. Judicial 
92. Ebersole & Hall, Courtran: A Modular Management and Research System for 
Courts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMA- 
TION AND STATISTICS SYSTEMS 203, 204 (1972). 
93. See generally J. Covington, supra note 42, at 27-35. 
94. See P. FISH, supra note 24, at 404-09. 
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Council of the Tenth C i r c ~ i t . ~ ~  Rather it appears that a compro- 
mise between judicial independence and effective judicial admin- 
istration has been made in the actual practice of the circuit coun- 
cils. Although Congress initially struck the compromise in one 
fashion, the circuit councils, by silent practice, have made an- 
other compromise, tilting the final result more towards judicial 
independence. While that result may be wise, the process used to 
reach it is certainly vulnerable to criticism. 
A similar phenomenon is visible in the workings of the judi- 
cial conference of the circuit. Although the conference has great 
potential for ameliorating the conflict between judicial independ- 
ence and judicial administration, it has not realized its potential. 
This failure seems to reflect the same sort of subterranean process 
of compromise that has defined the role of the circuit councils. 
As orginally conceived, the circuit conference was to be an engine 
for the administrative reform of the federal courts. Patterned on 
the informal conferences organized by Chief Judge Parker of the 
Fourth Circuit in the early 1930's, circuit conferences were ini- 
tially appreciated as being an exceptional tool for improving judi- 
cial administration in a decentralized organizational s t r u c t ~ r e . ~ ~  
"A Circuit Conference," stressed a 1932 report to the then Judi- 
cial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, "serves to bring together 
all the Federal Judges of the circuit and thus to give opportunity 
for the consideration of problems with which they are confronted 
in seeking to eliminate obstructions to the prompt and efficient 
administration of justice in the several d i s t r i ~ t s . " ~ ~  These early 
conferences provided a forum for discussing docket backlogs, 
unnecessary disparity in sentences, customs, rules and regula- 
tions in the district courts, and the other myriad administrative 
problems of the judiciary. In some circuit conferences, this inter- 
change breached the wall of isolation surrounding many district 
courts. Moreover, the conferences were natural sources of infor- 
mation for the Judicial Conference of the United States. It was 
the hope of Chief Justice Hughes that the circuits, with the aid 
of the circuit conferences, might act as foci of federal action af- 
fecting the judicial branch, much as the states were foci of admin- 
istration with regard to the state problems.98 
The Administrative Office Act of 1939,99 which mandated the 
95. 398 U.S. 74 (1970). 
96. See Morse, Federal Judicial Conferences and Councils: Their Creation and 
Reports, 27 CORNELL L. REV. 347, 354-57 (1942). 
97. [I9321 AIT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 12. 
98. See P. FISH, supra note 24, at 145-46. 
99. Ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified at 28 U.S.C. $ 5  332-333, 456, 601-610 (1970)). 




of the circuit conferences,loO was intended to further 
The five entities of judicial administration discussed 
11 were intended to gear their efforts to improving the 
administration of justice by permitting the federal courts, operat- 
ing within a decentralized structure, to set their own houses in 
order.lOl It was Congress' judgment that, in order for the courts 
to deal with basic problems of court administration within each 
circuit, the deliberative and advisory role of the circuit conference 
was essential. 
In addition, the circuit conferences are interrelated with the 
circuit councils. To perform their distinctive function, the circuit 
councils require the current, firsthand experience of the federal 
trial courts, the basic unit of the federal justice system. Often this 
experience is not forthcoming through informal channels or is 
only imperfectly communicated. In response to this problem, 
Congress designed the judicial conference of the circuit to serve 
both as a forum where that experience can be expressed and as  a 
conduit to convey the information. The power of the circuit con- 
ference therefore consists of its membership-the district and 
circuit court judges and representative lawyers who practice be- 
fore them. These individuals, who have the most accurate infor- 
mation and the most pertinent recommendations regarding the 
problems of prompt and efficient administration of justice can 
use the circuit conference to coordinate, concentrate and commu- 
nicate that  information to the circuit council and, through the 
chief judge of the circuit, to the Judicial Conference of the United 
States.lo2 
The circuit conference thus has a distinctive role in judicial 
administration. Significantly, however, it is without the power to 
give orders or specific direction to district court judges. Accord- 
ingly, judges generally do not, and certainly should not, view it 
as a direct threat to their independence. Nevertheless, the confer- 
ences have not met with the success that might be anticipated. 
Chief Justice Burger has stated: 
This provision (Section 333) like Section 332, has been fully 
used and applied by only a minority, at  least, of the Circuits in 
the sense clearly contemplated by Congress in its express lan- 
guage and plainly indicated by the legislative history. . . . 
[Lless than a majority of the circuits have consistently held 
- - 
100. Id. § 30l  (codified st 28 U.S.C. 9 333 (1970)). 
- 
101. See generally J. Covington, supra note 42, at 15-16, 27-28. 
102. 28 U.S.C. § 333 (1970). 
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meaningful conferences and in some places the conferences 
which are held fall far short of what Congress intended.lo3 
This inactivity of the circuit conferences may stem from the 
judges' belief that full compliance with the mandate of Congress 
will result in further interference with their independence. The 
basis of this belief merits examination. The first part of the statu- 
tory mandate directs the conference to meet together to consider 
the business of the courts.lo4 This directive in and of itself should 
not give rise to any fear that judicial autonomy will be imperiled. 
Indeed, most judges feel that discussion of common problems has 
a beneficial effect in assisting them in their official capacity. If 
in fact judicial reticence to a fully implemented circuit conference 
is due to a fear that it may result in further administrative con- 
trols, that reticence must be based on the second part of the 
legislative directive: The conferences are to recommend "means 
of improving the administration of justice within such circuit."lo5 
This advice of the circuit conference is undoubtedly to be directed 
to the circuit council, which possesses the statutory authority to 
make "all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious ad- 
ministration of the business of the courts within its circuit."lo6 
Some judges may believe that the advice-giving role of the confer- 
ence gives it an appreciable measure of indirect administrative 
power, a power capable ultimately of further reducing the auto- 
nomy of the individual judge. If this conjecture is correct, the 
relative inactivity of the circuit conferences is simply a camou- 
flaged compromise. By defaulting in their advice-giving role 
under the statute, the judges may well be responding to the inevi- 
- - -- - 
103. Burger, supra note 38, a t  741. 
104. The statutory language is as follows: 
The chief judge of each circuit shall summon annually the circuit and 
district judges of the circuit, in active service, to a conference a t  a time and place 
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table tension between the need for system controls and their own 
independence. 
To the extent that such a compromise has been reached, it 
is an unfortunate one. In the first place, a nonproductive circuit 
conference is disruptive of the integrated administrative machi- 
nery of the federal judiciary, a "machinery, created by Congress, 
to provide means whereby the work of the courts could be regu- 
lated and kept up to date, and provide a better and more prompt 
administration of justice."lo7 Because the elements of this admin- 
istrative machinery are interrelated and interdependent, an ac- 
tive and effective circuit conference is necessary to the success of 
the system as a whole. Moreover, a circuit conference not per- 
forming its proper role must inevitably undercut support for de- 
centralization. Paradoxically, by refusing to use the circuit con- 
ference for fear of diminishing his own independence, a judge 
renders less effective a structure purposely decentralized in order 
to give individual judges a greater influence in the administrative 
decisionmaking process.108 The tragic consequence of this is that 
when the need for controls becomes sufficiently acute, the circuit 
councils, in order to obviate possible extrajudicial intervention, 
may well assert their latent authority to control the course of 
judicial administration. Hopefully that action will be based upon 
the advice and assistance of the district court judges and lawyers 
rendered a t  the circuit conferences. But this can occur only if the 
conferences are functioning properly. log Accordingly, by diminish- 
ing the vigor of the circuit conference, its judicial members may 
well be facilitating the promulgation of administrative controls 
by the circuit council or by a national governmental authority 
which may severely threaten judicial independence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is time to recognize that decisions made in judicial admin- 
istration are compromises between the conflicting needs for judi- 
cial independence on the one hand and systems control on the 
other. Too often, advocates have asserted their positions in a 
vacuum, oblivious of the need to consider the legitimate concerns 
of the opposing position. Only by recognizing those legitimate 
107. S. REP. NO. 426, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939). 
108. See note 42 and accompanying text supra; see also Fish, supra note 24, at 140- 
44. 
109. For what one circuit conference has done, see Final Report of Committee on 
Reorganizaton of the Ninth Circuit Conference and Conference Committees, 75. F.R.D. 553 
(1976). 
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concerns and the inevitability of compromise in appropriate areas 
can intelligent decisions be made. What is needed, therefore, is 
an open evaluative and balancing process. 
Chief Justice Burger has identified the need for change in the 
system, contending that we now use cracker-barrel-grocery meth- 
ods in a supermarket age.l1° While the cracker barrel must go, its 
replacement must not unduly interfere with the independence of 
the grocer. Here lies the judicial administration challenge of the 
future. 
--- - - 
110. Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970). 
